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The majority of theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between decentralization and corruption argues 
that the devolution of power might be a feasible instrument to keep corruption at bay. We argue that this result crucially 
depends on the possibility to monitor bureaucrat's behavior. The bene fits of interjurisdictional competition only occur 
if there is a supervisory body such as a free press, which is often lacking in less-developed countries. Using cross-
country data, we analyze the relationship between decentralization and corruption taking diff erent degrees of the 
freedom of the press into account. Our main fi nding is that decentralization counteracts corruption in countries with 
high degrees of press freedom, whereas countries with low monitoring possibilities su er from decentralization. Our 
policy implication is, therefore, that a free press is a necessary pre-condition for successful decentralization programs. 
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It is a consensus that corruption is one of the most serious problems in developing
countries, in the scientiﬁc as well as in the public discussion. The question of how
to tackle corruption in developing countries is not yet answered convincingly. One
repeatedly proposed solution is to implement bureaucratic or inter-regional com-
petition through ﬁscal decentralization [see Fisman and Gatti (2002a) or Arikan
(2004)]. Competition might strengthen the accountability of bureaucrats and, thus,
reduce the ability of public oﬃcials to extract rents. Referring to these arguments,
the poverty reduction programs of international institutions contain decentraliza-
tion as a substantive instrument. For example, 12 percent of World Bank projects
completed between 1993 and 1997 involved decentralizing responsibilities to lower
levels of government [Litvack et al. (1998)]. More recently, in 2006 more than 19
percent, or 4.5 billion dollars, of the World Bank budget was spent on decentraliza-
tion projects [Development Committee (2006)]. Nevertheless, there is some doubt
concerning the eﬀectiveness of this development strategy. Developing nations usually
have a weak institutional background. Therefore, to assess whether or not decen-
tralization is recommendable for a certain policy purpose, it is necessary to analyze
the eﬀects of decentralization considering the whole country-speciﬁc institutional
framework. Although most empirical studies found lower corruption in decentral-
ized countries, we argue that the positive eﬀects of decentralization do not prevail if
comprehensive public monitoring and constitutional legality do not exist. The main
questions of our paper are the following: Can we identify a complementary rela-
tionship between decentralization and the possibilty of monitoring of bureaucrats
and its inﬂuence on corruption? Is decentralization in either case the right medicine
against the corruption disease? Or in short, does one size ﬁts all?
For this purpose we estimate a cross-section of 64 countries using alternative decen-
tralization and corruption measures. We show that the established positive eﬀect of
decentralization disappears for most speciﬁcations in our broader data set. We there-
after estimate a structural break model, controlling for a complementary relationship
between decentralization and the possibility of public monitoring of bureaucrats –
measured by the index of freedom of the press. Our main ﬁnding is that decentraliza-
tion counteracts corruption in countries with a high degree of freedom of the press,
while countries with a low degree of freedom of the press suﬀer from decentraliza-
tion. Our results imply that decentralization projects in developing countries should
2be accompanied by other institutions acting as supervisory body strengthening the
accountability of bureaucrats, such as a free press.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the related theoretical
and empirical literature and discusses the extent to which the results are applicable
for developing countries. Section 3 describes our data and empirical methodology.
Section 4 presents the estimation results and robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related literature
2.1 Some theoretical considerations
The predictions of theoretical models concerning the impact of decentralization on
corruption are ambiguous. Models favoring decentralization are based on the implicit
assumption that a working information infrastructure exists within a country. For
example, in yardstick competition models it is necessary that people could compare
policy outcomes in their home jurisdiction with neighboring regions, requiring free
information ﬂows. Similarly, models based on a tax-competition framework need
free information ﬂows as well as mobile capital and labor. The mechanism driving
corruption down in such models is (political) competition. Shleifer and Vishny (1993)
argue that “Countries with more political competition have stronger public pressure
against corruption – through laws, democratic elections, and even the independent
press – and so are more likely to use government organizations that contain rather
than maximize corruption proceeds.”[Shleifer and Vishny (1993), p. 610]. Models
expecting a negative impact of decentralization on corruption emphasize the danger
of close connections between local interest groups and local decision makers.
In their seminal paper, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) discuss corruption in a double
marginalization framework. They argue that diﬀerent monopolistic bureaucrats set
their bribery demands independently in order to maximize their own beneﬁt with-
out taking the negative externalities on other bureaucrats into account. In this case,
vertical decentralization leads to greater dispersion of government decision-making
powers, and the lack of coordination among bureaucrats results in excessive rent
extraction. 1 However, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) also emphasize that horizontal
1 A timely application of the Shleifer and Vishny (1993) model is provided by Bennett and
3decentralization leads to decreasing corruption through strengthening the competi-
tion between bureaucrats.
Another argument against decentralization is provided by Prud’homme (1995). He
argues that there are more opportunities for corruption at the local level because
local politicians and bureaucrats are likely to be more subject to the pressing de-
mands of local interest groups. Moreover, local decision makers have usually more
discretionary powers than national oﬃcials, increasing the negative eﬀect of decen-
tralization. He also discusses the role of an independent press in the context of
decentralization and corruption, arguing that “In some countries, at least, national
bureaucracies have a tradition of honesty that is often absent at the local level. The
pressure of media, inasmuch as it exists, would also be a greater disincentive at the
national than at the local level” [Prud’homme (1995, p. 211)]. In the same vein,
Tanzi (1995) argues on the basis of local interest groups. He states that corruption
may be more common at the local level compared to the national level, in particular
in developing countries. Local oﬃcials live closer to the citizens and this contiguity
leads to a higher impact of local interest groups and a higher level of corruption in
decentralized countries.
An ambiguous eﬀect of decentralization on corruption appears if the quality of bu-
reaucrats is considered. Persson and Tabellini (2000) assume that working in a cen-
tral government provides more prestige and power to the agents in contrast to a
local government. Thus, monitoring may be more intense on the central level, and
eﬀorts by centralized bureaucrats may be greater, reducing corruption. Central bu-
reaucrats are responsible for various tasks and localities simultaneously, whereas
under decentralization, agents are often responsible for a single task in a single ju-
risdiction. In the ﬁrst case, only the aggregate performance of politicians matters
for reappointment. The indirect accountability weakens the incentives to perform
well, since there is a smaller link between eﬀort and rewards. In contrast, in a de-
centralized government, decision makers are held accountable for all of their actions.
Therefore, decentralization may increase ﬁscal performance and decrease corruption.
The equilibrium impact of decentralization on corruption remains unclear.
More recent studies rely on competition between jurisdictions. Applying a tax-
Estrin (2006). The authors analyze the relationship between centralized or decentralized
infrastructure provision and corruption in developing economies. The impact of decentral-
ization on corruption was ambiguous depending on the eﬃciency of the tax system, the
venality of bureaucrats, and other issues.
4competition framework, Arikan (2004) shows that an increasing degree of competi-
tion for mobile capital between jurisdictions leads to less corrupt bureaucrats. Dincer
et al. (2006) analyze a yardstick-competition model based on Besley and Case (1995).
Voters compare the policy outcomes in their home jurisdiction with their neighbor
regions and thus implement interregional competition. Under certain circumstances,
this yardstick competition may lead to lower levels of corruption. 2 As mentioned at
the beginning of this section, it is noteworthy to examine the application of these
theoretical models to developing countries.
Studies on decentralization and corruption considering speciﬁc institutional prob-
lems of developing countries are rare. A criticism of the applicability of the classical
Tiebout (1956) approach to developing countries brings up Bardhan (2002), arguing:
“(...) the information and accounting systems and mechanisms of monitoring of pub-
lic bureaucrats are much weaker in low-income countries. (...) Thus, the diﬀerential
eﬃcacy of such mechanisms under centralization and decentralization becomes im-
portant” [Bardhan (2002), p. 188]. Moreover, he argues that mechanisms of political
accountability are especially weak in developing countries, and “(...) any discussion
of delivery of public services has to grapple with issues of capture of governments
at diﬀerent tiers by elite groups more seriously than is the custom in the traditional
decentralization literature.” 3 Therefore, in developing countries, there is no a priori
verdict in favor of decentralization. The existence of appropriate political institutions
seems to inﬂuence the impact of decentralization on corruption.
All in all, an important issue is that in almost all theoretical models which fa-
vor decentralization, the free ﬂow of information plays an important role. If the
monitoring of bureaucrats works, decentralization might indeed decrease corruption
through political competition. However, in most developing countries the existing
information infrastructure is controlled by corrupt or autocratic oﬃcials. Assump-
tions of models favoring centralization seem to be more appropriate for developing
countries. Therefore, our hypothesis is that decentralization is a suitable instrument
for controlling corruption in countries with an appropriate information infrastruc-
2 Careaga and Weingast (2000) and Rodden (2000) contribute to the literature on decen-
tralization and corruption by distinguishing between diﬀerent kinds of decentralization.
It turns out to be important whether the expenditures of sub-national governments are
ﬁnanced by own revenue sources or not, because central government transfers give local
decision makers the incentive to ignore the budgetary consequences of their mismanage-
ment.
3 See Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006b) and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006a) for details.
5ture, while countries without these necessary information ﬂows may suﬀer due to
decentralization.
2.2 Previous empirical studies
In substance, the majority of empirical studies have found corruption to be lower
in decentralized countries. These studies, however, do not consider the weak insti-
tutional structure of developing countries, such as the low degree of press freedom,
which hampers the public monitoring of bureaucrats. In the following, we survey
the most important empirical studies and discuss possible extensions in respect to
our main research question.
An initial empirical investigation is provided by Huther and Shah (1998), who found
a negative correlation between the degree of expenditure decentralization and the
level of corruption. Corruption is measured by a governance index for 80 developed
and developing countries. They report a signiﬁcant Pearson correlation coeﬃcient,
but due to the fact that no control variables are considered, omitted variables might
bias the results. Furthermore, from correlation it is not necessarily possible to draw
conclusions about the causal relationship.
Treisman (2000) analyzes the causes of corruption and takes the federal structure
into account. He ﬁnds a negative relationship between a dummy variable reﬂecting
whether a country has a federal or unitary constitution and the absence of corrup-
tion. 4 In contrast to the aim of our paper such a federal dummy does not necessarily
reﬂect ‘de facto’ decentralization. The existence of a federal constitution itself does
not necessarily reﬂect that sub-national governments have appreciable authority or
autonomy in decision making. The study of Treisman (2000) is, thus, not comparable
to the results of other papers measuring decentralization through ﬁnancial accounts
or the like. 5
A positive impact of ﬁscal decentralization on the absence of corruption is found
by Fisman and Gatti (2002a). To make their results comparable to the study by
Treisman (2000), they also consider a federal dummy, ﬁnding no signiﬁcant rela-
4 Note that almost all studies, like ours, use corruption measures which have high values
for a low level of corruption, thereby measuring the ‘absence of corruption’. See section
3.2 for details.
5 See section 3.1 for details on the measurement of decentralization.
6tionship. Furthermore, Fisman and Gatti (2002a) use the two-stage-least-squares
methodology to handle the endogeneity problem, considering a dummy variable for
the legal origin of the country as instrument. In two out of six speciﬁcations, the
results remain signiﬁcant, indicating that decentralization has a positive impact on
the absence of corruption. Our major concern with this study – and the motiva-
tion for ours – is that the authors do not consider subsamples for less developed
countries, taking into account that the inﬂuence of decentralization on corruption
may be reversed in diﬀerent institutional frameworks as suggested by Prud’homme
(1995), Litvack et al. (1998), Bardhan (2002), and others.
Fisman and Gatti (2002b) study the relationship between corruption in U.S. states
and dependency on central government transfers. They found corruption is positively
associated with larger federal transfers. In contrast to most other studies working
with country level data, corruption is measured by the number of convictions for
abuse of public oﬃce. Due to this major diﬀerence, these results are not directly
comparable to other empirical studies. However, a very important result of this
study is that diﬀerent types of decentralization do not always have the same impact
on corruption, supporting theoretical predictions of Careaga and Weingast (2000)
and Rodden (2000).
A comparable study to Fisman and Gatti (2002a) is Arikan (2004), who analyzes the
impact of several decentralization measures on Transparency International’s Corrup-
tion Perceptions Index in a cross-country data set. She also found corruption lower
in decentralized countries. However, considering endogeneity, the weak signiﬁcant
relationship turned to insigniﬁcance in almost all estimation speciﬁcations. Similar
to earlier studies, she neglected the diﬀerent institutional conditions of countries.
In contrast to most other previous studies, Lederman et al. (2005) analyze the
impact of diﬀerent political institutions on corruption based on a panel data set
of several developed and developing countries. To obtain feasible corruption data
for time series analysis, they use the International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG)
corruption index, which is available for all years since 1984. Besides several other
institutional variables, they consider central government transfers to other levels of
national government as a percentage of GDP as a decentralization measure. They
ﬁnd that decentralization measured this way decreases corruption.
Dincer et al. (2006) analyze U.S. state level corruption and dependency on the de-
gree of expenditure decentralization in a panel data set. They ﬁnd some evidence
7for corruption being smaller in more decentralized states as well as strong evidence
for the eﬀects of yardstick competition. However, the results do not remain signiﬁ-
cant when trying to handle the problems arising from endogeneity. As the authors
analyze homogeneous, highly developed U.S. state level data, the results cannot be
generalized for developing countries as is the aim of our study. Nevertheless, the
results are very interesting to investigate the transmission channel through which
decentralization eﬀects corruption. The studies discussed in our literature survey are
summarized in Table 1.
While the relationship between decentralization and corruption is ambiguous in the
theoretical literature, the majority of empirical studies found corruption to be lower
in decentralized countries. Although parts of the theoretical literature emphasize
that the impact of decentralization on corruption depends on monitoring possibil-
ities, mobility, and other factors, none of these studies has controlled whether the
relationship varies over diﬀerent institutional settings. In particular, the weak in-
stitutional design of developing countries has not been part of these investigations.
The aim of our paper is to investigate whether the possibility of public monitoring
of bureaucrats – reﬂected by freedom of the press – has an impact on the inﬂu-
ence of decentralization on corruption as discussed by Shleifer and Vishny (1993),
Prud’homme (1995), Bardhan (2002) among others. For this purpose we estimate
a structural break model considering complementary eﬀects of decentralization and
freedom of the press.
8Table 1
Previous empirical studies
Author(s) Dataa),b),c) Methodology Resultsd)
Huther Shah a) 80 countries Pearson correlation positive
(1998) b) ‘good governance’ measure
c) expenditure decentralization
Treisman a) up to 64 countries cross country negative
(2000) b) CPI index, Business international,
and Global competitiveness survey
WLS and OLS
c) federal dummy
Fisman Gatti a) up to 55 countries cross country positive
(2002a) b) CPI index, ICRG index, World
competitiveness report, German ex-
porter index, Business international,
and Global competitiveness survey
OLS and TSLS
c) expenditure decentralization
Fisman Gatti a) 50 U.S. states cross country positive
(2002b) b) convictions for abuse of public oﬃce OLS
c) share of federal transfers
Arikan a) 40 countries cross country positive
(2004) b) CPI index OLS and TSLS
c) number of local jurisdictions, share
of non-government employment, ex-
penditure decentralization
Lederman et al. a) 102 countries panel positive
(2005) b) ICRG index pooled OLS, ordered pro-
bit
c) central transfers
Dincer et al. a) 48 U.S. states panel positive
(2006) b) convictions for abuse of public oﬃce pooled OLS, RE and TSLS
c) expenditure decentralization
a) sample and sample size, b) corruption measures, c) decentralization measures, d) positive results mean that
corruption is smaller in decentralized countries.
3 The data
3.1 Decentralization measures
The proper deﬁnition of applicable decentralization measures is a challenging task.
Several measurement concepts have been elaborated in the literature. 6 One possi-
bility for the measurement of decentralization is to design indicators for the organi-
zation of governments with respect to laws and institutions from a political economy
perspective. In particular, the indices of Treisman (2002) have often been used in
the recent literature, and thus, we adopt them for our analysis. Among others,
Treisman has created two decentralization measures: a federal dummy (FEDERAL)
6 Excellent overviews of the problems of measuring ﬁscal decentralization are provided by
Treisman (2002) and Stegarescu (2005).
9capturing whether a federal constitution exists (1) or not (0) and a measure for the
number of vertical government tiers (TIERS). 7 As these measures are constructed
from formal national law, we classify them as ‘de jure’ decentralization measures.
Thus, these measures do not necessarily reﬂect sub-national government authority
or autonomous power in decision making. For this purpose we use ‘de facto’ decen-
tralization measures, factoring in the ﬁnancial resources of sub-national governments
as compared to the central government. To measure ‘de facto’ decentralization, we
construct measures using the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS), which
provides data on central, state, and local government revenues and expenditures for
several developed and developing countries since the early 1970s. Decentralization
indices are calculated by relating the sum of state and local expenditures (revenues)
to the consolidated total government expenditures (revenues). We use EXPDEC as
an abbreviation for the degree of expenditure decentralization and REVDEC for
the degree of revenue decentralization.
Oates (1972) discusses the general limitations of such ‘classical’ decentralization
measures. He basically argues that these measures do not always represent the actual
degree of decentralization because it is also important to consider the autonomy
of sub-national governments in expenditure or revenue decisions. Otherwise, if sub-
national autonomy is not taken into account, the ‘classical’ decentralization measures
would indicate a high level of decentralization, although a wide range of sub-national
expenditures and revenue decisions is determined by the federal government. For this
reason, the OECD has developed an internationally comparable framework to assess
the degree of control sub-central governments have over their revenues [see OECD
(1999)]. Several authors, e.g. Rodden (2003) and Stegarescu (2005), have applied
this framework to create new decentralization measures reﬂecting autonomy of sub-
national jurisdictions. However, as the data source suggests, these decentralization
measures are available only for OECD countries and therefore not applicable for a
wide range of countries. 8
Following Arikan (2004), we consider a ﬁfth alternative decentralization measure,
which can be derived from the employment statistics compiled by the International
Labor Organization (ILO). These statistics contain data on public (and private) em-
7 As both variables are not presented in Treisman (2002), we picked them up from other
papers using them and presenting the raw data in tables, such as Treisman (2000) and
Kessing et al. (2007).
8 See Stegarescu (2005) for details on measuring autonomy of sub-national jurisdictions.
10ployment, distinguishing between the national and sub-national government levels
for numerous countries. In the same manner as we proceeded with the other ‘de
facto’ decentralization measures, we can calculate the share of sub-national gov-
ernment employment (EMPLDEC), which is the ratio of sub-national government
employment to total government employment. Table A1 in the appendix reports the
correlations for all decentralization measures. Except for TIERS, all measures are
positively correlated.
3.2 Corruption measures
Besides measures of decentralization, we also need adequate measures of corruption.
We make use of three diﬀerent commonly applied measures of corruption. The ﬁrst
measure is the corruption index provided by the PRS Group in the International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This measure reﬂects the likelihood that government
oﬃcials will demand special payments and the extent to which illegal payments
are expected throughout lower levels of government. The ICRG index is based on
a survey of international experts and has been available since the early 1980s [see
Knack and Keefer (1995)]. A second corruption index is provided by the World Bank
and is commonly known as the Kaufman index (WBC). This indicator is available
beginning in 1996. The third corruption measure, the corruption perception index
(CPI), is provided by Transparency International. In contrast to the other indices,
the CPI is a meta index, which is calculated from the results of several other studies
on corruption. The index is available beginning in 1980, but due to the composition
of the index, not comparable between years. 9
All of these measures reﬂect the absence of corruption: This means that a high
value indicates low corruption. The ICRG index is deﬁned between 0 and 6, the
WBC index between -2.5 and +2.5, and the CPI index between 0 and 10. For
reasons of better comparability of our diﬀerent estimation results, we have rescaled
all three measures so that they have values between zero (most corrupt) and one
(least corrupt).
9 A discussion of time-series properties of the index is provided by Lambsdorﬀ (2005).
Panel data analysis is possible with a special data set starting in 1995.
113.3 Monitoring of Bureaucrats – Freedom of the press measure
The aim of our study is to investigate whether the monitoring possibilities of bu-
reaucrats determine the impact of decentralization on corruption. A ﬁrst commonly
used proxy for the observability of bureaucratic behavior is the index for freedom
of the press (e.g. Brunetti and Weder (2003)). A free and independent press is able
to reveal and report misuses of public oﬃce for private gain. It complements the
competition and accountability eﬀects of decentralization. Persons concerned with
corruption can reveal the bureaucrat’s behavior to a journalist and the media re-
ports will raise the costs for the bureaucrat as the probability of being detected and
punished is increased. Conversely, if the press is under the control of an autocratic
administration, the abuse of authority is virtually less risky for bureaucrats. In this
case, decentralization does not work. For our estimation approach, we revert to the
index for freedom of the press provided by Freedom House. The data is available
from 1980 to the present and currently covers 194 countries. Country narratives
examine the legal environment for the media, political pressures that inﬂuence re-
porting, economic factors that aﬀect access to information, and repressive actions
against journalists. These four categories are rated for the print media as well as
the broadcast media. The overall index ranges from 0 (total freedom of the press)
to 100 (highest violation of press freedom). Note that we have rescaled the index in
such a way that high values indicate a high degree of freedom of the press and low
values the opposite.
3.4 Other explanatory variables
As the level of corruption in a country is not solely determined by decentralization,
our estimations include several control variables following previous cross-country
studies, e.g., the study of Fisman and Gatti (2002a) and Arikan (2004).
Our baseline regression includes as control variables: the log of population size
(POP), the log of gross domestic product per capita in dollars at constant prices
of the year 2000 (GDPPC), the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP
as a measure for the degree of openness (GLOBAL), the diversity index of ethnic
fractionalization (ETHNO), the share of government expenditures in GDP as a mea-
sure for government size (GOVSIZE), and the index for the freedom of the press
(PRESS). Most of the data is provided by the World Bank in the World Develop-
12ment Indicators 2006 (WDI). One exception is the ethnic fractionalization, which
is provided by www.ethnologue.com. 10 Table 2 provides summary statistics of the
variables.
Table 2
Summary statistics, cross country data
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ICRG (0...1) 64 .54 .20 .18 1.0
CPI (0...1) 64 .50 .24 .19 .97
WBC (0...1) 64 .57 .22 .28 .99
POP (Mio.) 64 60.80 180.00 1.20 1,150.00
GDPPC ($) 64 7,866 8.857 95.52 31.521
GOVSIZE 64 .16 .05 .06 .32
GLOBAL 64 .73 .35 .19 1.57
ETHNO 64 .40 .27 .02 .93
PRESS 64 64.9 20.7 18.1 92.7
FEDERAL 55 .27 .45 0 1
TIERS 61 3.59 .80 2 6
EMPLDEC 51 .44 .22 .08 .93
EXPDEC 64 .22 .14 .02 .57
REVDEC 64 .17 .13 .01 .53
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Benchmark regressions
As a benchmark case, we ﬁrst estimate the impact of decentralization on corrup-
tion in a cross-country data set without testing for a complementary relationship
between decentralization and the possibilities to monitor bureaucrat’s behaviour.
This estimation approach enables us to compare our results with previous research
studies on the basis of a broader data set covering up to 64 countries. The basic
estimation equation has the form
CORRUPTi = α + β · CONTROLi + γ · DECENTRi + i (1)
10 See Table A2 in the appendix for data sources and deﬁnitions.
13where CORRUPT as independent variable reﬂects the level of corruption in country
i, CONTROL is a vector of control variables mentioned above, and DECENTR
represents our diﬀerent decentralization measures. To reduce causality problems, the
timing of independent variables is chosen such that they are long averages for the
period 1980-1995, prior to the corruption measures for 1996-2000. We are mainly
interested in the sign and signiﬁcance of γ, which might be positive, supporting the
ﬁndings of Fisman and Gatti (2002a), Arikan (2004), etc. or negative as in Treisman
(2000). Note that the corruption measures reﬂect the absence of corruption, and thus
a positive sign means a high degree of decentralization is associated with low cor-
ruption. We present estimation results for all three alternative corruption measures
as dependent variables and all mentioned decentralization measures, respectively.
Table 3 contains the cross-sectional results. White’s test for heteroskedasticity in
the residuals rejects the null of no heteroskedasticity; thus, all standard errors of
coeﬃcients are calculated using White (1980) correction. The coeﬃcients of our ‘de
jure’ decentralization measures (FEDERAL and TIERS) are insigniﬁcant in all
speciﬁcations. A similar picture occurs for the employment decentralization mea-
sure. The ‘de facto’ decentralization measures (EXPDEC and REV DEC) have
no signiﬁcant impact on corruption with the ICRG index as the corruption mea-
sure (speciﬁcation 4 and 5) as well as with the WBC corruption measure. With the
CPI index as the corruption measure, we obtain a positive and weakly signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient for EXPDEC (speciﬁcation 9). REV DEC barely misses conventional
signiﬁcance levels.
Our control variables show the expected signs and support the ﬁndings of earlier
studies. The size of a country in terms of population (POP), the ethnic fraction-
alization (ETHNO), and the economic openness (GLOBAL) have no signiﬁcant
impact on corruption. Moreover, richer countries (GDPPC) and countries with a
larger government (GOV SIZE) show less corruption. Last but not least, countries
with a high degree of press freedom show less corruption (PRESS), which is in line
with Brunetti and Weder (2003). Thus, we can conclude from our benchmark anal-
ysis that the strong positive impact of decentralization on the absence of corruption
found in almost all earlier studies is very sensitive to the underlying measurement
concepts of both decentralization and corruption, as well as to the sample of coun-
tries. Our broader data set shows that no such strong relationship exists. In the
next section, we present evidence that the relationship between corruption and de-










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































154.2 Cross-sectional analysis considering monitoring possibilities
The hypothesis we test now is that the relationship between decentralization and
corruption depends on the possibilities of monitoring of bureaucrats. Almost all
theoretical work, as e.g. the yardstick competition model by Dincer et al. (2006) or
the tax competition model by Arikan (2004), assumes free information ﬂows between
the agents. Therefore, we now consider the freedom of the press as an indicator for
the monitoring possibilities of bureaucrats and reinvestigate the relationship between
decentralization and corruption. However, before specifying an econometric model
to test our hypothesis, we ﬁrst examine our data.
Fig. 1 shows a scatterplot of our whole data set with our decentralization measure on
the abscissa and the ICRG index on the ordinate. The monitoring possibilities are
considered such that we classiﬁed our countries into three groups: the upper third
of countries with the highest degree of the freedom of the press measure is marked
by quadrangles, countries in the middle third are marked by dots, and those in the
lowest third of press freedom are asterisked. The ﬁgure also includes three trendlines,
each of which reﬂects the relationship between decentralization and corruption in
the three diﬀerent groups of countries.
The scatterplot suggests that the relationship between decentralization and corrup-
tion indeed depends on the monitoring possibilities reﬂected by the freedom of the
press. Countries with good monitoring possibilities show a positive impact of decen-
tralization on the absence of corruption (upper trendline in Fig. 1), countries with
middle monitoring possibilities come up with just a weak relationship (continuous
line), and in countries with weak monitoring possibilities, decentralization is strongly
negatively associated with the absence of corruption (dotted line). Inspection of the































lowest freedom of press middle freedom of press highest freedom of press
trend lowest trend middle trend highest
  Fig. 1. Decentralization, corruption and freedom of press. Note: decentralization is mea-
sured by the degree of expenditure decentralization (EXPDEC), corruption is measured
by the ICRG index, and freedom of press are q-quantile dummy variables for q = 3.
Doubtlessly, the inspection of scatterplots is only a ﬁrst step in answering our re-
search question. Therefore, we set up an econometric model to test our hypothesis
empirically. For this purpose, we built dummy variables for q-quantiles of the free-
dom of the press measure (FP1q,...,FPqq) and interact them with our decentral-
ization measure in a structural break model.
The estimation equation now takes the form




δk · (DECENTRi · FPkqi) +
q−1 X
k=1
θk · FPkqi + i. (2)
17The interaction terms of decentralization and the q-quantile dummies show us
whether the relationship between decentralization and corruption depends on the
monitoring possibilities of bureaucrats. In other words: The interaction terms in-
dicate whether decentralization and monitoring possibilities have a complementary
eﬀect on corruption or not. The FPkq-dummy for the countries with the highest
q-quantile of the freedom of the press measure is not considered in the estimations,
and, thus, is used as a reference group. γ captures the overall impact of decentraliza-
tion on corruption, while δk captures the partial eﬀect of the k interaction terms. We
obtain the total eﬀect of decentralization on corruption in the countries by adding
the coeﬃcient of an interaction term to the coeﬃcient of the general eﬀect.
Due to space limitations, we subsequently present estimation results only for the
ICRG index as the corruption measure and EXPDEC as the decentralization mea-
sure in the body of our paper. 11 Table 4 presents estimation results for three dif-
ferent models. Speciﬁcations (1) and (2) replicate our benchmark regressions for
better comparability of our results. In speciﬁcations (3) and (4), we estimate our
model setting q = 2, which is similar to using just one dummy (FP12) for the 50%
of countries with the lowest degree of freedom of the press. Finally, we set q = 3,
distinguishing between high, middle, and low degrees of freedom of the press, which
is a direct test of Fig. 1. Thus, we have FP13 as a terzile dummy for those countries
with the lowest degree of freedom of the press, FP23 as a dummy for those coun-
tries with a middle degree of freedom of the press, and FP33 as a dummy for the
countries with the highest degree of freedom of the press. Note that FP33 does not
enter the regressions, as we use it as a reference group. Furthermore, we drop the
PRESS variable in our speciﬁcations when considering interaction terms because
the impact of the freedom of the press is now covered by our FPkq-dummies. We
apply the OLS estimation technique as well as TSLS to handle the problems arising
from possible endogeneity bias. We follow Wasylenko (1987), Porta et al. (1999), and
Arikan (2004) by using the logarithm of each country’s area in square kilometers
as an instrument for decentralization. Moreover, we further use the lag structure
as in our benchmark regressions. Signiﬁcance of our estimates is based on White-
corrected standard errors. In our estimations, all absolute values (POP, GDPPC,
and AREA) are in logarithms.
11 See Appendix Table A5 and Table A6 for robustness tests using alternative
decentralization-, corruption-, and monitoring-measures.
18Table 4
Cross-section estimations considering freedom of the press
Dependent variable: ICRG
q = 2 q = 3
OLS TSLS OLS TSLS OLS TSLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Const. -.0745 -.1874 .0900 -.0371 .1617 -.1228
(-.28) (-.54) (.34) (-.10) (.53) (-.28)
POP -.0062 -.0001 .0006 .0062 .0010 .0172
(-.28) (-.01) (.05) (.28) (.08) (.73)
GDPPC .0506*** .0546*** .0457*** .0526*** .0437*** .0430**
(2.90) (3.04) (3.23) (3.34) (2.71) (2.46)
GOVSIZE .6512* .7276* .5951* .6835* .5990* .6600*
(1.90) (1.76) (1.95) (1.83) (1.92) (1.90)
ETHNO -.0416 -.0470 -.1001** -.1030** -.1014** -.1436**
(-.80) (-.87) (-2.06) (-2.05) (-2.17) (-2.30)
GLOBAL -.0585 -.0577 -.0365 -.0381 -.0407 .0006
(-.89) (-.87) (-.64) (-.67) (-.62) (.01)
PRESS .0035*** .0035***
(2.88) (2.93)
EXPDEC .1254 -.0156 .4493*** .2765 .3327** .3303











Obs. 64 64 64 64 64 64
Adj. R2 .65 .65 .70 .69 .72 .68
Note: t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance levels are reported as follows: * for a 90%-signiﬁcance-
level, ** for 95% and *** for more than 99%.
The benchmark results of speciﬁcations (1) and (2) show that decentralization
(EXPDEC) has no signiﬁcant direct impact on corruption, contrasting the re-
sults of former studies such as Fisman and Gatti (2002a), Arikan (2004), or Dincer
et al. (2006). However, this is not the whole truth. Speciﬁcations (3) and (4) show
that decentralization has a positive overall impact on corruption, but exerts a neg-
ative impact in those countries with a low degree of freedom of the press or in other
words: with weak possibilities to monitor bureaucrats. On the basis of the coeﬃcient
of EXPDEC (0.4493) and the coeﬃcient of the interaction term EXPDEC∗FP12
(-0.6667), the aggregate eﬀect of decentralization on corruption in those countries
with the 50% lowest degree of freedom of the press is 0.4493-0.6667=-0.2174, thus
negative. The strong negative impact also holds for IV-estimations using the loga-
rithm of country’s area in square kilometers. The last two speciﬁcations of Table 4
show estimations similar to the scatterplot of Fig. 1. The eﬀect of decentralization
19on the absence of corruption is in general positive, while it is strongly negative in
countries with the lowest degree of freedom of the press (EXPDEC∗FP13). As
the scatterplot indicated we are not able to identify signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
countries with a middle degree of freedom of the press. Countries with a high degree
of freedom of the press serve as reference group: the coeﬃcient for those countries
can be calculated from the other coeﬃcients and remains positive.
Table A5 in the appendix shows the major results for robustness tests, using al-
ternative corruption indices (ICRG, CPI and WBC) as well as a diﬀerent de-
centralization measures (REV DEC – speciﬁcations (19) to (36)). The econometric
speciﬁcations are similar to those of Table 4, but we do not report coeﬃcients of our
control variables due to space limitations. For each possible combination of those
variables we ﬁrst present regression results without interaction terms, then results
separating countries as above or below the mean degree of the freedom of the press
measure (q = 2), and ﬁnally, we use terzile dummies (q = 3). Our results are robust
for all estimations using q = 2. For terzile dummies (q = 3), we do not receive
signiﬁcant results in all speciﬁcations, although the coeﬃcients show the correct
sign.
As a second robustness test we use an alternative measure for the possibility of mon-
itoring of bureaucrats. For this purpose we refer to the measure of civil liberties also
provided by Freedom House. Countries with governments who grant no or just a few
civil liberties will have also weak possibilities of people to monitor the behavior of
bureaucrats, or if so, people will not have the power to sanction corrupt activities.
The results of regressions using interaction terms of the civil liberty measure and
decentralization measures are reported in Table A6 in the appendix. The underly-
ing estimations are similar to the estimations reported in Table 4. Again, we ﬁnd
a negative impact of decentralization on corruption in those countries where the
monitoring possibilities are lacking supporting our results above.
Altogether, an examination of the data as well as our regression results shows that
the impact of decentralization on corruption depends on the possibilities of mon-
itoring of bureaucrats. As long as monitoring works, decentralization is indeed an
eﬀective instrument to keep corruption at bay. Otherwise, if those basic control in-
stitutions do not work, decentralization is harmful. This result contrasts the ﬁndings
of most earlier empirical studies in the ﬁeld, but is in line with theoretical consid-
erations, especially the work of Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006b) and Bardhan and
Mookherjee (2006a).
205 Conclusion
Fiscal decentralization plays a major role in World Bank’s anti-corruption and de-
velopment strategy. Based on earlier studies that found corruption to be lower in
decentralized countries, decentralization is assumed to be an appropriate instru-
ment to tackle the corruption disease in developing countries. We argue that the
possibilities to monitor bureaucrat’s behavior are an important determinant of the
relationship between decentralization and corruption. To test this hypothesis em-
pirically, we have analyzed the impact of decentralization on corruption, taking into
account freedom of the press. We have ﬁrst applied a broader data set using diﬀerent
decentralization and corruption measures and reestimated previous studies, ﬁnding
that the positive impact of decentralization disappears in almost all speciﬁcations.
In a second step, we have estimated a structural break model, taking into account
monitoring possibilities of bureaucrats. We ﬁnd that in countries with good monitor-
ing possibilities, as measured by freedom of the press, decentralization has a positive
impact on the absence of corruption. Otherwise, if monitoring does not work, de-
centralization has a negative eﬀect. This association is robust for a wide range of
potential sources of omitted variable bias as well as endogeneity bias. We also show
that these results are non-sensitive to the underlying measurement concepts of de-
centralization, corruption, and monitoring possibilities. Our ﬁndings are in contrast
with existing empirical studies such as Fisman and Gatti (2002a), Arikan (2004)
and Dincer et al. (2006), but in line with the theoretical literature, which assumes
free information ﬂows between agents involved.
The policy implications of our study are obvious: decentralization is a feasible in-
strument to reduce corruption if the monitoring possibilities of bureaucrats work.
Otherwise, if those institutions do not work suﬃciently, decentralization can con-
tribute to high corruption levels. Institutions linking foreign aid to decentralization
initiatives should, therefore, carefully consider whether the institutional background
of the target countries in terms of monitoring possibilities is adequate.
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23A Appendix
Table A1
Pairwise correlation coeﬃcients of diﬀerent decentralization measures
“de jure” “de facto”
FEDERAL TIERS EMPLDEC EXPDEC REVDEC
FEDERAL 1.0000
TIERS .0203 1.0000
EMPLDEC .4115*** -.0235 1.0000
EXPDEC .5795*** -.0232 .6722*** 1.0000
REVDEC .5949*** .0309 .6102*** .9385*** 1.0000
Note: ***, **, and * indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table A2
Data sources and deﬁnitions
Variable Deﬁnition Source
POP Population in Mill. WDI
GDPPC Gross Domestic Product per capiata in 2000 dollar WDI
GOVSIZE Government consumption expenditures as share of
GDP
WDI
ETHNO Degree of ethnolinguistic fragtionalization Ethnologue
GLOBAL Imports plus exports as share of GDP WDI
PRESS Index of freedom of press (inverted) Freedom House
CIVLIB Index of civil liberties (inverted) Freedom House
ICRG International Country Risk Guide corruption measure
(0 = highest corruption; 6 = absence of corruption)
PRS Group
CPI Corruption Perception Index (0 = highest corruption;
10 = absence of corruption)
Transparency In-
ternational
WBC World Bank corruption measure (-2.5 = highest cor-
ruption; 2.5 = absence of corruption)
World Bank
FEDERAL ”Dummy variable for federal constitutions: 0 = uni-
tary country; 1 = federal country”
Treisman (2002)
TIERS Index for number and democratization of vertical gov-
ernment tiers
Treisman (2002)
EMPLDEC Share of subnational government employment in total
government employment
ILO
EXPDEC Share of subnational government expentitures in total
government expenditures
IMF GFS





Country POP GDPPC GOVSIZE ETHNO GLOBAL PRESS CIVLIB
Albania 3.08 1.03 11.16 0.26 0.48 43.23 2.92
Argentina 32.70 7.04 9.73 0.21 0.19 64.00 5.44
Australia 17.30 17.05 18.71 0.13 0.37 88.54 7.00
Austria 7.79 19.82 19.48 0.54 0.81 82.85 7.00
Azerbaijan 7.29 0.74 16.40 0.37 0.97 27.62 3.00
Belarus 10.00 1.22 20.28 0.40 1.21 20.00 2.67
Belgium 10.00 18.67 21.98 0.73 1.41 90.77 6.76
Bolivia 6.98 0.94 12.96 0.68 0.48 75.85 4.88
Brazil 151.00 3.26 15.35 0.03 0.19 66.69 4.92
Bulgaria 8.55 1.57 16.45 0.22 0.91 64.15 3.80
Canada 28.20 19.59 21.47 0.55 0.63 84.31 7.00
Chile 13.40 3.60 11.50 0.03 0.57 73.62 5.20
China 1150.00 0.51 12.94 0.49 0.35 18.08 1.64
Colombia 36.20 1.85 14.00 0.03 0.34 42.31 4.36
Costa Rica 3.15 3.46 14.64 0.05 0.79 82.92 6.56
Croatia 4.60 3.89 25.21 0.87 1.03 49.92 4.73
Czech Republic 10.30 5.16 22.16 0.07 1.13 78.85 6.15
Denmark 5.21 25.37 26.26 0.05 0.70 90.62 7.00
Dominican Republic 7.25 1.81 6.42 0.31 0.71 67.00 5.32
Estonia 1.47 3.64 19.96 0.48 1.51 79.69 6.00
Ethiopia 52.60 0.10 15.60 0.84 0.32 35.62 2.28
Finland 5.02 19.25 21.50 0.14 0.60 87.08 6.68
France 56.90 19.12 23.31 0.27 0.46 77.38 6.16
Germany 80.10 19.47 20.26 0.19 0.53 85.46 6.25
Hungary 10.40 4.09 10.64 0.16 0.90 72.69 5.16
India 875.00 0.34 11.54 0.93 0.20 58.77 4.72
Indonesia 182.00 0.59 8.86 0.85 0.55 39.54 3.08
Iran, Islamic Rep. 54.50 1.36 14.24 0.80 0.33 22.15 1.96
Ireland 3.61 15.84 17.47 0.22 1.28 82.62 6.92
Israel 5.11 15.23 31.79 0.67 0.85 71.15 5.56
Italy 57.00 16.10 18.78 0.59 0.45 70.85 6.44
Kazakhstan 15.70 1.27 12.70 0.70 0.90 31.92 3.13
Kenya 24.30 0.36 17.53 0.90 0.59 36.92 2.92
Latvia 2.54 3.29 14.29 0.60 1.05 78.46 5.87
Lithuania 3.57 3.26 20.46 0.34 1.04 79.23 5.80
Malaysia 19.00 2.87 13.60 0.76 1.57 34.15 3.40
Mexico 85.40 5.23 10.09 0.14 0.42 51.85 4.52
Moldova 4.25 0.57 17.30 0.59 1.22 42.38 3.87
Mongolia 2.13 0.48 25.55 0.33 1.20 66.00 3.72
Netherlands 15.10 19.06 24.14 0.39 1.10 86.08 7.00
New Zealand 3.53 16.11 18.75 0.10 0.59 91.62 7.00
Nicaragua 4.09 0.84 22.83 0.08 0.62 57.54 4.08
Norway 4.30 31.52 20.76 0.66 0.73 92.69 7.00
Panama 2.47 3.50 15.69 0.32 1.55 67.31 4.96
Paraguay 4.33 1.50 7.26 0.35 0.62 48.08 4.24
Peru 22.30 2.01 9.83 0.38 0.33 49.85 4.48
Philippines 63.80 0.94 10.29 0.85 0.73 62.92 4.68
Poland 37.80 3.68 18.35 0.06 0.52 77.62 5.12
Portugal 10.00 8.16 16.91 0.02 0.67 84.00 6.60
Romania 22.60 1.87 10.81 0.17 0.61 55.15 3.80
Russian Federation 145.00 1.94 17.85 0.28 0.57 40.69 3.60
Slovak Republic 5.28 3.53 21.62 0.31 1.15 66.92 5.54
Slovenia 1.98 8.53 20.55 0.17 1.18 74.54 6.20
South Africa 36.60 3.06 18.46 0.87 0.50 72.77 4.24
Spain 39.10 11.22 16.76 0.44 0.44 81.23 6.28
Sri Lanka 16.70 0.66 9.49 0.31 0.74 44.77 3.84
Sweden 8.62 22.90 27.97 0.17 0.68 90.38 7.00
Switzerland 6.81 31.52 11.10 0.55 0.72 90.85 7.00
Thailand 55.60 1.53 11.12 0.75 0.80 62.46 4.52
Trinidad and Tobago 1.22 5.77 14.55 0.70 0.84 72.92 6.12
United Kingdom 57.70 20.10 20.22 0.14 0.53 80.00 6.52
United States 257.00 28.72 16.23 0.35 0.21 85.85 7.00
Uruguay 3.14 5.20 12.96 0.09 0.41 72.38 5.88
Zimbabwe 10.40 0.58 18.99 0.53 0.56 29.23 2.88
25Table A4
Country statistics – continued
Country ICRG CPI WBC FEDERAL TIERS EMPLDEC EXPDEC REVDEC
Albania 2.22 2.47 -0.67 3 0.12 0.20 0.02
Argentina 2.45 2.97 -0.43 1 3 0.76 0.38 0.32
Australia 4.85 8.67 2.00 1 3 0.63 0.41 0.28
Austria 4.59 7.94 1.97 1 4 0.42 0.30 0.27
Azerbaijan 1.95 1.94 -1.09 3 0.25 0.21
Belarus 2.77 3.55 -0.75 0 4 0.22 0.30 0.28
Belgium 3.73 6.58 1.41 1 4 0.57 0.12 0.06
Bolivia 2.59 2.49 -0.76 0 4 0.11 0.18 0.18
Brazil 2.82 3.76 -0.07 1 4 0.86 0.34 0.25
Bulgaria 2.93 3.73 -0.26 0 4 0.24 0.19 0.16
Canada 5.40 8.88 2.15 1 4 0.64 0.57 0.53
Chile 3.75 7.12 1.36 0 4 0.34 0.08 0.06
China 1.70 3.24 -0.40 0 5 0.93 0.55 0.51
Colombia 2.31 3.28 -0.45 0 3 0.82 0.29 0.19
Costa Rica 3.96 4.91 0.73 0 4 0.09 0.03 0.03
Croatia 2.86 3.51 -0.08 3 0.09 0.09
Czech Republic 3.42 4.46 0.40 0 3 0.32 0.20 0.16
Denmark 5.74 9.64 2.36 1 3 0.65 0.44 0.31
Dominican Republic 3.10 3.10 -0.48 0 3 0.08 0.03 0.01
Estonia 3.77 5.88 0.63 0 3 0.34 0.27 0.21
Ethiopia 2.00 2.68 -0.58 5 0.02 0.02
Finland 6.00 9.65 2.47 0 3 0.78 0.38 0.31
France 3.38 6.87 1.46 0 4 0.44 0.19 0.12
Germany 4.58 7.89 1.92 1 4 0.87 0.41 0.35
Hungary 4.01 5.04 0.64 0 3 0.48 0.21 0.12
India 2.50 2.83 -0.34 1 5 0.49 0.46 0.33
Indonesia 1.47 2.10 -0.94 0 5 0.28 0.11 0.03
Iran, Islamic Rep. 3.10 2.88 -0.59 0 4 0.04 0.05
Ireland 3.16 7.64 1.73 0 3 0.24 0.08
Israel 3.38 6.97 1.08 0 3 0.11 0.07
Italy 3.01 4.82 0.68 0 4 0.39 0.22 0.07
Kazakhstan 1.94 2.51 -1.00 4 0.26 0.30 0.28
Kenya 2.28 2.10 -1.03 0 6 0.18 0.05 0.06
Latvia 2.40 3.70 0.03 0 3 0.57 0.23 0.19
Lithuania 2.70 4.55 0.19 3 0.37 0.29 0.22
Malaysia 3.03 5.07 0.39 1 3 0.32 0.19 0.16
Mexico 2.42 3.39 -0.34 1 3 0.29 0.20 0.20
Moldova 1.70 2.65 -0.75 3 0.53 0.29 0.27
Mongolia 2.91 3.28 -0.23 0.36 0.27
Netherlands 5.58 8.85 2.20 0 3 0.25 0.25 0.08
New Zealand 5.26 9.46 2.36 0 3 0.49 0.11 0.09
Nicaragua 3.47 2.69 -0.56 0 4 0.07 0.08
Norway 5.05 8.84 2.10 0 3 0.38 0.33 0.22
Panama 2.00 3.40 -0.31 0 4 0.02 0.02
Paraguay 1.58 1.91 -1.08 0 3 0.04 0.03
Peru 2.82 3.94 -0.28 0 4 0.18 0.07
Philippines 2.52 2.82 -0.49 0 4 0.27 0.10 0.07
Poland 3.25 4.17 0.35 0 3 0.61 0.23 0.15
Portugal 4.36 6.52 1.31 0 0.32 0.10 0.07
Romania 2.72 2.98 -0.33 0 3 0.13 0.09
Russian Federation 1.59 2.47 -0.84 1 4 0.34 0.38 0.40
Slovak Republic 3.15 3.91 0.27 0 4 0.40 0.08 0.08
Slovenia 3.40 5.89 0.96 2 0.16 0.11 0.09
South Africa 3.16 4.87 0.47 0 0.44 0.24 0.14
Spain 4.13 6.53 1.38 1 4 0.60 0.24 0.15
Sri Lanka 3.49 3.38 -0.23 0 4 0.18 0.03 0.04
Sweden 5.69 9.27 2.30 0 3 0.56 0.36 0.33
Switzerland 4.84 8.80 2.23 1 3 0.54 0.51 0.46
Thailand 2.03 3.32 -0.32 0 5 0.41 0.08 0.05
Trinidad and Tobago 2.66 4.33 0.10 0 2 0.04 0.03
United Kingdom 4.73 8.56 2.07 0 4 0.64 0.25 0.13
United States 4.28 7.57 1.76 1 4 0.73 0.44 0.40
Uruguay 3.00 5.23 0.64 0 2 0.34 0.09 0.10
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